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Using a national survey of U.S farm households, we investigate the interrelationship 
between participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the decision to 
work off the farm. We go on examine the effects of these two decisions on farm and farm 
household efficiency and productivity by estimating stochastic frontier productions for 
farm output and multiple output-orientated distance functions that consider income from 
agricultural sales, the CRP and off-farm work as outputs of the farm household. We 
control for the effects of self selection in estimating both the frontier production and 
distance functions.  
 
It appears that operators’ decisions to work off the farm have led to significant 
improvements in household resource allocation between farm and other productive 
activities by farm households -- leading to high technical efficiency for both farm and 
farm household activities. In contract, participation in the CRP alone leads to the 
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  1Introduction 
For at least the past half Century, the dependence of farm households in the 
United States on income from non-farm sources has increased steadily, ultimately 
narrowing, or actually reversing, the gap between incomes of farm and non-farm 
households. According to ERS data, income from off-farm work, now the largest 
component of farm household income, is estimated to be well over twice the net income 
from farming. 
These changes in the composition of farm household income occurred against the 
backdrop of a traditional commodity-oriented farm policy until environmental goals were 
elevated along side commodity policy objectives through the conservation compliance 
provisions of the 1985 farm bill. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), introduced 
at that time, has become the largest Federal program targeting land use, and it now pays 
farmers about $2 billion per year to remove 34 million acres from crop production.  
Currently, CRP payments in the aggregate are small compared with off-farm 
income, and off-farm work and participation in CRP are quite different livelihood 
strategies. However, since both decisions lead to substantial reductions in resources under 
the control of farm households that are committed to agricultural production, they may be 
related to one another and also have important implications for the efficient allocation of 
resources between the farm business and farm household.  
To understand the relationship between off-farm work by the farm operator and 
participation in CRP, one objective of this paper is to test if these two decisions are made 
jointly or are made independently. In the process of conducting this analysis, we find that 
this decision process is best captured by a bivariate choice model. Based on this 
  2estimated model, we develop a better understanding of how these decisions depend on the 
stock of human capital and risk attitudes of farm operators, as well as land quality, farm 
size, and participation in other government programs.  
A second objective is to investigate the effects of these decisions on the efficiency 
of resource use by farm households. In contrast to other applications that rely on a simple 
index as the proxy for technical efficiency, we estimate stochastic frontier production 
functions for each of the four groups of farms, those that: participate in both CRP and off-
farm work; participate only in CRP; participate only in off-farm work; and participate in 
neither. Since an important contribution of this research is to compare farm productivity 
and efficiency with that of the household, we also estimate multi-product, output-oriented 
stochastic distance functions for farm households in each of the four groups.
1An 
important methodological contribution that sets our analysis apart from others is that we 
control for the effects of sample selection in estimating both the frontier production and 
distance functions. To account for the sample selection effects in decomposing the 
random and the technical inefficiency components of the errors for the frontier 
production and distance functions, we extend the two-stage method-of-moments 
procedure developed by Huang et al. (2002) to accommodate two choices. Using the 
Malmquist formula, the measures of farm and farm household technical efficiency are 
compared between groups, as are the differences in total factor productivities.   
The remainder of the paper begins with the development of the several 
components of the analytical framework and econometric methods. Next, we describe the 
data from USDA’s 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). These data 
                                                 
1 Recently, others have also been interested in studying the efficiency of farm households both in the 
United States and elsewhere (e.g. Paul and Nehring 2005 and Nehring, et al. 2005) and abroad (e.g. Chavas, 
et al. 2005).  
  3are used in the empirical analysis because this farm household enumerative survey is 
USDA’s primary vehicle for collecting data on a wide range of issues about agricultural 
resource use, program participation, and farm and farm household financial conditions 
and demographics. Next, the empirical results are presented and discussed. The final 
section summarizes the results and highlights important implications for policy.  
Analytical Framework 
There are three components to our empirical analysis which has its foundation in 
a generalization of an endogenous switching regression model (Lee 1978). Within this 
framework, a bivariate probit model is estimated to capture any interrelationship between 
CRP participation and the decsion to work off the farm. This also provides the basis for 
testing a null hypothesis that participation in CRP and off-farm work are separate 
decisions. As the second component of the analysis, we estimate stochastic production 
and multiple outputs distance functions for the farm and farm houshold, respectively, and 
each of them is corrected for self-selection. By then decomposing the error terms for 
these functions we derive consistent estimates of technical efficiency. Finally, in order to 
highlight the effects of these two decisions on farm and farm household productivity, we 
use the Malmquist fromula to compare the productivity and scale efficiencies across 
groups of farm housholds.  
The Discrete Choice Model 
As is common in the discrete choice literature, each of these two decisions is 
assumed to be determined by a comparison between the benefits of participation and non-
participation. Consistent with a household production model developed by Chang (2006), 
the CRP participation decision is determined by comparing the government’s potential 
  4payment for land in CRP and the reservation per acre return (perhaps risk adjusted) to the 
farmer of retaining land in production. Similarly, the decision to work off the farm is 
determined by comparing the potential off-farm market wage with the shadow value 
(again perhaps risk adjusted) of the farmer’s time in farming. The reduced form equations 
that capture these comparisons can be specified as:    
(1)     ;    1 1 1 1 ' * e X H I + = 2 2 2 2 ' * e X H I + =  
Ii  = 1  iff   Ii* > 0;    and      Ii  = 0  iff   Ii* < 0     i =1, 2, 
where X1 and  X1 are vectors of the exogenous variables, H1 and H2 are vectors of the 
parameters of interest, and e1 and  e2 are the random disturbance terms. The latent binary 
choice variables (I1*, I2*) are the participation decisions of each farmer.
2 The actual 
binary decision indicator for each decision is observed as 1 (0) only if the latent variable 
is greater (less) than zero. Suppose the joint distribution of (e1, e2) follows a bivariate 
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joint nature of these two decisions. The bivariate probit model is estimated by maximum 
likelihood methods with the following log likelihood function: 
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Since the correlation coefficient between these two decisions is estimated in the bivariate 
probit model, a test of the hypothesis that these two decisions are independent is 
equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis that this correlation coefficient is equal to zero.  
Estimating Technical Efficiencies for the Farm and Farm Household  
                                                 
2 For simplicity, subscript 1 refers to the CRP decision, and subscript 2 refers to the off-farm job of the 
operator.  
  5To conduct the part of the analysis, we first specify a stochastic farm production 
frontier, which includes only farm outputs and inputs. We then specify a multi-product, 
output oriented distance function (e.g. Fare, et al. 1994) to account for three farm 
household outputs (sales from farm production, CRP payments, and off-farm earning). To 
account for their effects on farm and farm household productivity, we treat the decisions 
to work off the farm and participate in CRP as endogenous.
3   
Multiple-Output Distance Function   
Based on results by Shephard (1970), the multiple-output distance function can be 
specified as: } { ) ( ) / ( : min ) , ( x T x y y x D ∈ = θ , where x and y are input and output vectors 
and T (.) represents the production technology. The output distance function is non-
decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and concave in y but decreasing in x.
4 To 
estimate this function empirically, linear homogeneity with respect to outputs must be 
imposed, which can be accomplished by normalizing by one of the outputs (e.g. Coelli 
and Perelman 2000). The multiple-output distance function can be rewritten as: 
 for any k > 0. The conventional way is to define the factor k as 1/y ) , ( ) , ( y x kD ky x D = j, 
where yj is the output for specific output j. We obtain:  *) , ( ) / , ( 0 0 y x D y y x D j = , where 
y* are the other output vectors normalized by output yj.  
Assuming the multiple-distance output function can be approximated by a 
translog functional form, one can obtain:
5
                                                 
3 Although Paul and Nehring (2005) and Nehring et al. (2005) specify the off-farm income as a farm 
household output, they do not account explicitly for the effects of the decision to work off the farm in 
estimating technical efficiency. 
4 Throughout the discussion, we focus only on the multiple output distance function, but our results also 
apply to the single output farm production function which is a special case of this more general form.  
5 The translog functional form is specified since it is flexible, but it still allows us to impose the 
homogeneity constraints necessary for studying productivity. This specification is commonly utilized in 
other studies (e.g. Paul and Nehring 2005; Coelli and Perelman 2000)). 
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where i is the specific participant group (i = 1,…,4), m and n are outputs, l and k are 
inputs. For convenience, we can rewrite equation (4) as: 
(5)       ) ln( ) , , *, , ( ) ln( i i i i i i i ji D r y x TL y − = − β α  
Equation (5) is consistent with the standard stochastic production frontier framework 
(Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977), since it can be further rewritten as:  
 (6)       i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i ji r y x TL u v r y x TL y ε β α β α + = − + = − ) , , *, , ( ) , , *, , ( ) ln(  
where the random variable (vi) is assumed to have a normal distribution, N~(0, σ
2
vi). The 
random variable (ui) is the technical inefficiency component, and it is assumed to follow 
a half normal distribution, N
+~ (0, σ
2
uj). These two components are assumed to be 
independent. The random variable (εi) is the composite error. 
Accounting for Sample Selection in Estimating Stochastic Frontier Functions 
  Since it is unlikely that the decisions to work off the farm or participate in CRP 
have no effect on farm output or the level of farm household production, we have a 
potential self-selection problem, which, if not accounted for, could lead to inconsistent 
parameter estimates. However, because of the complicated error structure, it is impossible 
to accommodate the bivariate probit choice mechanism in a one-step MLE procedure to 
estimate the multiple-output distance function.  We resolve this problem through an 
extension of methods by Huang et al. (2002). We first estimate the multiple-distance 
output function based on the composite error term, and include estimated Inverse Mills 
Ratios from the bivariate probit choice model to account for sample selection. We then 
  7estimate the composite error and decompose it into two error components using the 
method of moments.                                 
To develop this methodology, we know that the conditional expected production 
of each group, under the assumption of a trivariate normality of the errors between 
bivariate probit choice model and equation (6), ( i e e ε , , 2 1 ), is: 
 (7)   i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i r y x TL I I E r y x TL I I Y E 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 ) , , *, , ( ) , | ( ) , , *, , ( ) , | ) (ln( λ ρ λ ρ β α ε β α + + = + = −  
where λ1i and λ2i are two inverse mills ratios corresponding to the CRP and off-farm 
work decisions, respectively.
6 With the correction for the bivariate probit selection 
problem, it can be shown easily that the OLS estimation of equation (7) for each group 
yields consistent estimators for ( i i i i i r 2 1 , , , , ρ ρ β α ).  
To calculate technical efficiency of each participant within each group, the 
composite error term from equation (6) is decomposed into its random error and technical 
inefficiency components. In order to do this, we must first recognize that the expected 
values of the one-sided error terms (E (ui)) are not equal zero. We must rewrite equation 
(6) as: 
(8)       ,  )] ( [ ) ( ˆ ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ *, , ( ) ˆ ln( i i i i
F
i i i i i i i i i u E u v u E Y r y x TL Y + − + − = + = − ε β α
which implies that:  
(9)        and       ) ( ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ *, , ( i
F
i i i i i i i u E Y r y x TL − = β α ) ( )] ( [ ˆ i scfi i i i i u E e u E u v + = + − = ε . 
         Using the predicted residuals ( i ε ˆ ) from equation (7), we can easily see that the 
parameters ( ) can be calculated based on the fact that the second and third central 
2
vi σ
                                                 
6 The formula of λ1i and λ2i can be found in Greene (2002). In contrast to the binary choice mode, they 
accommodate the correlation between these two choices and differ in each subgroup. 
  8moments of ( i ε ˆ ) should be equal to the second and third central moments of (vi-ui) since 
E(ui) is constant. The parameters ( ) and the composite error can be calculated as: 
2 2 ˆ , ˆ vi ui σ σ
(10)   
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Once this stochastic frontier has been estimated, the calculation of the technical 
efficiency index requires point estimates for the random variable ui of each farmer. 
Following Jondrow, et al. (1982), the expected value of ui given the composite error (vi-ui) 
under the assumption of a half-normal distribution is:  
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Once these conditional expected values are obtained, the technical efficiency index of 
each farmer within each group can be calculated as: 
(12)     . 
) ˆ | ˆ (




Estimating Productivity Differences Between Groups 
To understand differences in productivity between groups, we utilize the 
generalized relative TFP index. This index is originally due to Malmquist (1953), but has 
been generalized to isolate scale efficiencies by Fare, et al. (1994).
7
                                                 
7 To use this generalized TFP formula in our comparisons, it is necessary to estimate farm production 
frontiers and two multiple-distance output functions for each group. One of them is restricted to exhibit 
constant returns to scale; the other is not. For each function, the error is decomposed using a two-stage 
method- of-moments as described above.  
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where M(.) represents the relative TFP index of group g relative to group s (the reference 
group). The superscripts V and C refer to the variable returns to scale (VRS) and constant 
returns to scale (CRS), respectively. The term TE
Cg (ys,xs) represents technical efficiency 
for group g using the level of inputs for group s.  
Total factor productivity is decomposed into three sources. The ratio outside the 
square brackets measures the relative difference in technical efficiency between group g 
and s -- the relative distance between actual production and the frontier function between 
groups for the VRS technology, or we can say this measures the difference of how the 
best technologies are used. The first term in brackets measures the ratio of scale 
efficiencies between groups – the relative difference between the farm households of 
different groups in terms of the appropriate size of operation compared to the one in 
which no industry reorganization would improve the efficient production of outputs or 
use of inputs.
8 The second term in brackets measures the relative difference in technology 
-- a comparison of the production frontiers between groups.
9
                                                 
8 Improvements could be made if the firm were initially operating on a variable returns to scale production 
function, but at too small a level (e.g. a point of increasing returns to scale). In this case, efficiency would 
be improved by having the firm expand its scale while keeping the same input mix. Conversely, if the firm 
were operating at a level in which returns to scale were decreasing, then efficiency would be improved if 
the scale of operation were reduced while keeping the same input mix.   
9 To decompose TFP for both the farm and the farm household frontiers, it is necessary to estimate four 
functions for three of the groups: a CRS and a VRS farm production frontier and a CRS and VRS multi-
product distance function. For the group that participates in neither CRP nor off-farm work, we need only 
estimate CRS and VRS farm production frontiers. 
  10Using equation (13), it is easy calculate the three components of TFP from the 
estimated frontier functions and to compare these components of TFP across farms and 
farm households within each group. Such a direct comparison is, however, not possible 
across groups because the farm and farm household production environments (the 
frontiers) are assumed to differ by group, and the numbers of farms in each group also 
differ. Therefore, by necessity, our comparisons of differences in the three components of 
TFP between the groups are based on the individual group average.  
The Data 
The primary farm household data used are from the 2001 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS), an enumerative survey conducted each year by the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). This data set differs markedly from the earlier farm costs and return 
survey in providing the basis for assessing changes in the well being of farm households 
nationwide. To understand the participation decisions in CRP and off-farm work of farm 
households, we limit our attention to farms classified as crop farm households because of 
our interest in examining the effect of CRP participation and off-farm work on farm and 
household productivity. The final sample count is 2,223. 
Besides ARMS data set, we also collect external data sources for the information 
of land quality, local area economic characteristics, and certain aspects of the physical 
terrain. The economic characteristics of local area are merged into our ARMS data set 
based on the county-level from the Bureau of Economic Analysis income files in 2000, 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis employment files in 2000, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and the Census of Population, STF-3 file. We also define the land quality as the 
  11product of a variable reflecting the length of the growing season and the land capability 
class. The data on the length of the growing season are those used in a global economic 
model developed to evaluate long-run agricultural and environmental sustainability. 
Specifically, the growing season variable is an estimate of the length of the rain-fed 
growing season. The land capability classes are those used in the Natural Resources 
Conservation Survey (NRCS) and elsewhere to classify land based primarily on physical 
soil characteristics. This index is calculated based on quantifiable factors in the universal 
soil loss equation.
10
Another critical factor affecting CRP participation is the Environmental Benefits 
Index (EBI). The EBI score in part determines the maximum price that can be paid for 
land offered into the CRP. It is assigned in each environmental category for each offered 
parcel as prescribed by the USDA handbook that lists specific details on how points are 
to be assigned for each conservation practice and land characteristic. It would have been 
ideal to have an EBI index available for each farm household in the ARMS data, but this 
was not the case. As an alternative, we use the EBI data from Jaroszewski (2000) to 
estimate an EBI for major ERS agricultural regions based on the percentage of land in the 
various conservation practices currently enrolled in CRP. By using these data, it is 
explicitly assumed that when CRP participation commitments were made, land was likely 
to be committed to these land uses in similar proportions.  
Table 1 contains information summarizing the frequency of CRP participation and 
off-farm work. According to the marginal frequencies, about 22% of the farm households 
                                                 
10 The variables are defined as:  LQH96 = "high" land quality = GS*(LCC1+LCC2); LQM96 = "medium" 
land quality = GS*(LCC3+LCC4); and LQL96 = "low land quality = GS*(LCC5+LCC6+LCC7+LCC8), 
where LCCi = percentage of land in the county that is in soil capability class i, and GS = the ratio of the 
mean rain-fed season to the mean irrigated season. 
  12participate in CRP, and in about 56% of them, the operator works off the farm.
11 Out of 
this sample of 2,223 households, only 282 (about 13%) participate in both activities; 211 
(about 10%) participate only in CRP, while 960 (about 43%) participate only in the off-
farm labor market. Table 2 contains summary data for important variables. 
Empirical Results 
The empirical results are discussed in three sections. The first summarizes the 
several tests of the joint decision structure. The second describes those factors that affect 
the decision to work off the farm or participate in CRP. Recall that the definitions of the 
variables used in the analysis are in Table 2. The third section describes our analysis of 
differences in technical efficiency and total factor productivity among the four separate 
groups of farm households.  
The Bivariate Choice Results 
The bivariate probit model is a straightforward extension of the binary choice case, 
but it allows for a correlation between each binary choice. This special characteristic 
provides the basis to justify the joint rather than an independent decision specification.  
Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimation of the bivariate probit model. 
The parameter (ρ ), the correlation between the error terms in the two participation 
equations does capture the joint nature of these two decisions: ρ = 0.12, and it is 
statistically different from zero. More formally, the independence assumption between 
CRP and off-farm work decisions can be tested through a likelihood ratio test (LR) under 
the null hypothesis that the parameter (ρ ) is equal to zero. The LR test value of our 
                                                 
11 The participation rate of our study is weighted by full sample weights, since we are interested in the farm 
household population. Our results are compatible with those by Ahearn and Lee (1991); According to data 
from the Census of Agriculture, about 30% of farm operators worked some off the farm in 1929, and this 
increased to about 53% by 1982.   
  13model is 7.1, is greater than the critical value (3.8) for a 95% confidence level; thus we 
reject the null hypothesis that these two decisions are made independently.  
Determinants of CRP Participation
According to the estimated bivariate probit model, participation in CRP depends 
generally on some characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, land quality, and the 
circumstances in the local economy (Table 3). The probability of participation in CRP 
increases with farm size (CROPSIZ1), but the probability of participation is lower if the 
farm is primarily engaged in vegetable or nursery production (CROP456), rather than 
cash grain production. This difference probably reflects the higher opportunity cost of 
vegetable or nursery farms of removing land from production.  
In addition to the negative effect of the opportunity cost of land on participation, 
one could also hypothesize that the likelihood of participation would rise with the level of 
the annual CRP payments. Unfortunately, it is impossible to include such a variable in 
participation equations such as this, because of the sample selection problem. Although 
we have no information on actual bids or bids accepted for our sample farms, but we do 
find that farm households located in areas where the EBI scores for land enrolled are high 
are more likely to participate in CRP, ceteris paribus. It is likely that in areas where the 
EBI scores were high, farmers might well expect to have higher bids accepted.  
Based on the measures of soil quality in the region described above, participation 
in CRP rises as the proportion of land in the surrounding county is classified as high 
(LQH_96) or as low (LQL_96) quality. This result suggests that CRP participation may 
be higher in areas where land is well suited for agriculture and lower in the areas where it 
is less suitable for crop production.  
  14There are two variables that suggest participation in CRP has something to do 
with the life-cycle of the farm operator. The likelihood of CRP participation increases 
with age (OP_AGE). Thus, as farmers get older, committing some land to CRP may be 
one way of reducing operator labor requirements on the farm. This may also be a way of 
holding onto farmland assets until they are needed for the retirement years, or so that they 
can be passed on through an estate. The fact that there is a positive correlation between 
the probability of farmers working off the farm and the probability of participation in 
CRP (as measured by ρ) may also reflect a desire to reduce operator labor requirements 
as land is taken out of production. Finally, the probability of CRP participation increases 
as a farmer’s education (OP_ED_C) level increases; this is perhaps an indication that 
investments in human capital might lead to increases in CRP. Our findings square with 
the notion that investments in human capital may lead to a greater appreciation by 
farmers in the value of the environmental benefits from CRP.  
There are also several ways in which risk can affect the participation in CRP. As 
aversion to risk increases, the likelihood of participation in a program where payments 
are certain, such as CRP, should increase. This conclusion is supported by the negative 
sign on the variable “RISK” in Table 3 (e.g. high values for “RISK” are associated with 
farmers who prefer more risk). Furthermore, the assumption of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA) is also consistent with the fact that decoupled payments, “AMTA_A”, 
reduce the likelihood of CRP participation. With DARA, farmers are likely to be less 
concerned about diversifying into risk-free income opportunities as wealth increases 
  15through decoupled payments.
12 Finally, since commodity-program related loan deficiency 
payments (LDP_A) reduce farm income variability, these payments also reduce risk 
averse farmers’ concerns for allocating farm resources to CRP.       
Participation in other programs also affects the likelihood for CRP participation. 
For example, if the farmer is enrolled in a voluntary agricultural district, subject to a 
farmland preservation easement, or is located in an agricultural protection zone or an area 
zoned exclusively for agricultural use (the variable AGDIST), the farmer is less likely to 
participate in CRP. Many farmers participate in these types of programs (most of which 
are state or local programs) out of concern for maintaining their land in agricultural 
production in rapidly growing areas where there is competition for land for non-
agricultural purposes. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that, ceteris paribus, these farmers 
would be less likely to enroll land in a program such as CRP that essentially takes land 
out of production. The fact that the likelihood of CRP participation falls as the proportion 
of population that is urban rises would seem to reinforce this explanation.
13 In contrast, 
farmers who participate in EQIP are also more likely to participate in CRP. Participation 
in both EQIP and CRP could reflect a farmer’s stewardship for the environment 
(reflected in our theoretical section) by removing venerable land from production, while 
at the same time using more environmentally friendly practices on land still in production. 
Determinants of Off-Farm Work Decision 
  As expected, the decision of the farm operator to engage in off-farm work also 
depends on characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, and the circumstances in the 
                                                 
12 By assuming non-constant absolute risk aversion, Hennessey’s (1998) framework is also consistent with 
our results in the sense that he shows that under these conditions, decoupled payments can affect crop 
production alternatives.     
13 Duke (2004) also found that the likelihood of participation in CRP is lower in highly urban areas.   
  16local economy (Table 3). As in much of the existing literature (e.g. Sumner 1982; 
Benjamin and Guyomard 1994; Abdulai and Delgado 1999), our results continue to 
confirm the fact that older farmers are more likely to work off the farm.
14 However, the 
effect is nonlinear. Although the operator’s education (OP_ED_C) has a positive effect 
on the probability of participation in off-farm work, the years of experience on the farm 
(OP_EXP) has a negative effect that increases at an increasing rate. Farm operators raised 
on farms (RAISE_OP) are also less likely to work off the farm. Since returns to off-farm 
labor are likely to be less variable than farm returns, the indication that the likelihood of 
off-farm participation is lower for farm operators willing to accept more risk (a negative 
coefficient on “RISK” in Table 3, a variable that increases as a farmer accepts more risk) 
is consistent with the theory of risk averse behavior, but it is not statistically significant.  
The likelihood of working off the farm decreases with family size (H_SIZE), but 
increases if the spouse is primarily a homemaker (SP_HMAK). This latter result may not 
square with the fact that the operator’s likelihood of working off the farm increases with 
the spouse working off the farm. To disentangle these results, we might well have to 
specify the characteristics of household size in greater detail and deal with the fact that 
the decision of the spouse to work off the farm may be endogenous. Attempts are being 
made to disentangle these effects in subsequent analysis.  
The likelihood of participation in off-farm work declines with farm size 
(CROPSIZ1) and farm tenancy (TENANCY), and it is lower for vegetable or nursery 
operations (CROP456). The negative effects on the likelihood of participation of both net 
worth (NETWORT1) and participation in government programs (e.g. AMTA_A) other 
                                                 
14 Our result is not consistent with Whittaker and Ahearn (1991); they found that young operators were 
more likely than older operators to work off the farm. 
  17than CRP may reflect wealth or scale effects on off-farm labor supply (Goodwin and 
Mishra, 2004). The negative effect of tenancy (as measured by the proportion of acreage 
owned) on the likelihood for off-farm job participation reflects a greater commitment to 
agricultural production (ceteris paribus) from operators who own their own land. Finally, 
there is some indication that the strength of the local economy, as measured by the 
proportion of jobs that are manufacturing (MANUF), increases the likelihood to work off 
the farm. The relative extent to which the local economy depends on jobs in the trade 
sector (TRADE) reduces the likelihood of participation in off-farm work.  
Farm and Farm Household Technical Efficiency and Productivity 
To compare productivities, we first estimate four separate farm production 
functions, one for CRP participants and one for non-participants. These are frontier 
functions and have a translog form. To investigate differences between farm productivity 
and the overall productivity of the farm household productivity, we also specify and 
estimate translog multiple-output distance function for three of the four groups. For the 
group that is neither in CRP nor works off the farm, the farm and household production 
functions are identical.  
For the farm production functions, gross cash sales are used as the measure of 
agricultural production, while there are four inputs, hours worked on the farm, operated 
cropland, hired labor cost, and capital.
15 The labor hired cost includes regular hired labor 
and contract labor. Capital use is measured by the fixed value of building and farm 
equipment excluded for the value of principal operator’s dwelling. The output and input 
                                                 
15 Output is the same as used by Goodwin and Mishra (2004) to study the effect on efficiency from off-
farm work. The list of inputs is similar (but not identical) to those specified by Nehring, et al. (2005), and 
we measure them differently. Any aggregate measure of materials inputs was so collinear with capital that 
it was eliminated—an implicit assumption is that they are in fixed proportion to capital.  
  18variables used to estimate multiple-output distance function are slightly different from the 
ones we used for farm production function. Along with the farm production output, we 
specify two other outputs as the non-farm outputs: the wages and salaries from the off-
farm work and the annual payment of CRP as the income from environmental program 
participation. The hours of the operator and spouse working off the farm are also added to 
the hours worked on the farm; the aggregated input for land is the sum of the operated 
cropland area and the acres enrolled in CRP. The rest of the input variables are identical 
to those in the farm production function.      
Tables 4 through 7 contain estimates for the translog farm production functions 
and multiple output distance functions. To emphasize the differences in farm and farm 
household production, we report the results by group: the group doing both (Table 4), the 
group of CRP participants (Table 5), the group working off the farm (Table 6), and the 
group doing neither (Table 7). The translog production functions fit the data quite well; 
many of the coefficients are statistically significant individually and when taken as a 
group. For all models, the estimated production elasticities are positive at the sample 
means. The production elasticities for farms and farm households are quite different as 
well. The estimated scale economies differ; For example, the returns to scale (RTS) are 
much lower for household than for farm production for the group working off the farm 
(0.57 vs 1.29 from Table 6).
16 For the group receiving CRP payments, the economies of 
scale for household production are somewhat higher (0.84 from Table 5), but the 
economies of scale for farm production for this group is nearly identical to that of the 
                                                 
16 This result is consistent with Paul and Nehring (2005), although those authors do not account explicitly 
for the sample selection effect of off-farm work. 
  19household. (0.85 from Table 5). The same is true for the group of farms that participate in 
CRP and work off the farm (0.97 vs. 1.01 from Table 4).           
Measures of Farm and Farm Household Technical Efficiency and Productivity
We estimate differences in technical efficiency by decomposing the two error 
components of the stochastic farm production and multi-product distance functions. The 
Malmquist TFP Index formula provides a method to calculate differences between groups, 
in terms of technical and scale efficiencies, production frontiers, and total factor 
productivities. In making the comparisons across groups, the components of TFP are 
based on the average value of each component for each group; the comparisons are 
reported as ratios of average efficiency indexes for each group compared to the average 
efficiency indexes for the group that participates in neither off-farm work nor CRP. 
(Since this reference group does not participate in off-farm work and CRP, household 
production and farm production are the same.) These comparisons are reported in Table 8.  
We focus initially the technical efficiencies between groups. When comparing 
only farm production for this group working off the farm and the reference group, the 
average efficiencies are nearly the same (a ratio of 1.01).
17 However, for total household 
production; the ratio of average technical efficiencies for these two groups is 1.56. From 
this evidence, it appears that these the operators’ decisions to work off the farm have led 
to significant improvements in resource allocation resulting in much higher technical 
efficiencies of household production.  
In contrast, the story is quite different for those farms that have land in CRP, but 
where the operators do not work off the farm. For this group of farms, the average 
                                                 
17 In contrast, Goodwin and Mishra (2004) found that there was a slight decrease in efficiency due to off-
farm work.  
  20technical efficiency for household production is well below that for those in the reference 
group (a ratio of 0.76). It is difficult to know why the technical efficiency for this group 
is so low, but one possible explanation is that the efficiency of production is reduced by 
removing land from production without making comparable reductions in labor used on 
the farm.   
Evidence to add support to this explanation is found by examining the technical 
efficiency of farm households participating in both programs. It is for this group, 
compared with the reference group, that we find the ratios of technical efficiencies for 
both the farm and the household to be greater than unity (1.25 and 1.69, respectively). 
Since participating in both programs allows these farm households to reallocate both 
family labor and land to other income earning uses simultaneously, the household seems 
able to improve resource allocation both at the farm and the household levels.  
Relative to the reference group, the ratios of the scale efficiencies for the other 
three groups are higher for farm household production than they are for farm production. 
Moreover, the ratios of scale efficiencies for household production are all larger than 
unity. These results would seem to suggest that by withdrawing some resources from 
agriculture these three groups of farms come closer to an optimal scale of production, 
given other fixed resources, etc.    
The combined effects of participation in CRP and off-farm work are perhaps best 
seen in the comparisons of total factor productivity relative to the reference group. From 
the information in Table 8, we see that participation in CRP, committing to an off-farm 
job, or both decreases the total factor productivity of the farm operation (ratios for these 
three groups are 0.93, 0.75, 0.83, respectively). These differences are due to the fact that 
  21the farm production frontiers for these three groups are lower than for the reference group. 
However, the situation is quite different if farm household production is considered. For 
two of the three groups (those in CRP and working off the farm and those working off the 
farm), the higher technical and scale efficiencies relative to the reference group outweigh 
the fact that the production frontiers lie inside that of the reference group—resulting in 
higher relative levels of total factor productivity; the ratios are 1.15 and 1.51, respectively. 
In contrast, the average total factor productivity of the farm household for those 
participating only in CRP is lower than for the reference group (a ratio of 0.87).   
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
To better understand the interaction between the farm business and the farm 
household, this paper focuses decisions by the farm household regarding participation in 
CRP and off-farm work, and the efficiency of resource use by the farm and the household. 
We begin by identifying those factors that explain participation in these two major non-
production related sources of income for farm households. For the appropriate subgroups 
of farm households, and accounting explicitly for the effects of these two decisions in 
estimating frontier farm production multiple output distance functions for farm 
households, we are able to compare differences of the farm and farm household 
production across subgroups of farms in terms of the technical and scale efficiencies and 
total factor productivities.  
We find substantial evidence to support the hypothesis that decisions by the farm 
household to participate in CRP and to work off the farm are made jointly rather than 
independently. Participating in CRP depends generally on some characteristics of the 
farm (including the type of farm), the farm operator (including age, experience, and 
  22attitudes to risk), land quality, and the circumstances in the local economy. There are also 
some differences in participation by major ERS production region. As one would expect, 
decisions to work off the farm are related to many of these same factors, although the 
direction and magnitude of some of the effects are quite different.  It is also true that both 
decisions are affected by participation in other farm programs. In particular, the 
probability of participation in CRP increases with farm size, but perhaps due to the higher 
opportunity cost of land removed from production, the probability of participation is 
lower if the farm is primarily engaged in vegetable or nursery production, rather than 
cash grain production.  
To shed additional light on the effects of these two decisions on farm and farm 
household resource allocation, we estimate frontier farm and multiple output distance 
function for each group. Our results suggest that participation in CRP has no detrimental 
effect for technical efficiency if only farm production is considered. However, if one 
takes a broader view that includes the entire set of household production activities, both 
the average technical efficiency and total factor productivity for this group are well below 
those for the group that participates in neither CRP nor off-farm work. Quite the opposite 
is true for the group that participates in both CRP and off-farm work and the group that 
only works off the farm.  
From this evidence, it appears that the operators’ decisions to work off the farm 
(including those that also participate in CRP) have led to significant improvements in 
resource allocation if one views the situation from the perspective of the entire farm 
household. It is difficult to know why the reverse is true for those participating only in 
  23CRP. One possible explanation is that the efficiency of production is reduced by taking 
land out of production without making comparable reductions in labor used on the farm.   
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Table 1: Sample Proportion of the Joint Choice  
   CRP     
OP  No (%)  Yes (%)  Total (%) 
No (%)  35  9   44  
Yes (%)  43   13   56  
Total (%)  78  22   100  
** Weighted with full sample weights   
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Variable  Definitions Mean Std. Dev.
Program Participation 
CRP If the household enroll in CRP or CREP (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.23 0.42
OP If the operator worked off the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.56 0.50
Characteristics of the Operator and Spouse
OP_AGE Age of the operator 54.57 13.71
OP_ED_C Education level of the operator (years) 13.08 2.45
OP_EXP Years of the operator working on farm job 25.50 63.00
RISK Risk preference of the operator; =0 if risk averse, 10 if risk loving 4.43 2.46
RAISE_OP If the operator was raised on the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.79 0.41
SP_HMAK If the spouse is a home maker (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.25 0.43
H_SIZE Number of household members 2.74 1.26
Farm Household Characteristics of the Farm
CROPSIZ1 Operated acreage of cropland divided by 1,000 0.32 0.68
TENANCY Owned acreage devided by total acreage 0.95 2.08
CROP456 If vegetable, fruit, or nursery farm, (=1):otherwise (=0) 0.21 0.41
AMTA_A Per acre AMTA (Agricultural Market Transition Act) payment 5.42 12.57
LDP_A Per acre LDP (Loan Deficiency Payment) payment 8.25 18.63
NETWORT1 Household networth value ($100,000) 4.61 15.70
AGDIST If farm in local agricultural preservation program (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.05 0.22
Environmental Characteristics
EBI Environmental benefit index 61.67 3.85
LQH_96 Index of high quality land of 1996 0.33 0.25
LQL_96 Index of low quality land of 1996 0.23 0.19
EQIP If participate in EQIP (=1), otherwise(=0) 0.00 0.05
Locational Factors and Local Economic Conditions
URBAN Percent of labor market area’s population living in urban areas, (1990 census) 56.06 22.17
MANUF LMA’s employment in manufacturing (%), lagged one year 13.84 6.90
TRADE LMA’s employment in wholesale and retail trade (%), lagged one year 20.32 2.35
REGN1 If located in ERS region 1(Heartland) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.28 0.45
REGN3 If located in ERS region 3 (Northern Great Plains) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.08 0.27
REGN567 If ERS region 5 (E.Uplands), 6 (S.Seaboard), 7 (Fruitful Rim) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.29 0.45
REGN9 If located in ERS region 9 (Mississippi Portal) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.05 0.22
   
  27Table 2: Summary Statistics (cont.)
Variable Variable  Definitions Mean Std. Dev.
Production Performance
OUTPUT Agricultural sales ($1,000) 60.39 218.92
CRPOUT CRP Annual Payment ($1,000) 1.42 5.20
OFFOUT Income of Off-Farm Work ($1,000) 9.28 47.41
HOUR_OFF Hours worked off the farm by operator and spouse 1,980 1,648
ACRE_CRP Acres enrolled in CRP 37.77 163.99
HOUR Hours worked on the farm by the operator and spouse 1,694 1,401
LC_C Operating cost, including livestock expense,crop expense,energy expense 36,267 98,346
LAND Operated acres 407 923
CAPITAL Value of total non-current assets minus the value of the principal operator dwelling 466 1600
LABOR Hired labor cost 9,823 61,908
* Note: All variables are weighted with full sampling weights
   
 
  28Table 3:  Estimated Bivariate Probit Model
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value
Constant -4.95 1.41 -3.50
OP_AGE 0.03 0.00 9.41
OP_ED_C 0.07 0.02 4.62
RISK -0.06 0.02 -3.20
EQIP 1.13 0.41 2.76
LQH_96 0.54 0.21 2.57
LQL_96 -1.07 0.33 -3.28
EBI 0.05 0.02 2.18
AGDIST -1.16 0.27 -4.38
AMTA_A -0.03 0.00 -6.33
LDP_A -0.01 0.00 -5.06
CROP456 -1.92 0.27 -7.24
CROPSIZ1 0.23 0.04 5.73
REGN1 0.16 0.10 1.56
REGN567 -0.39 0.14 -2.68
REGN9 1.25 0.27 4.69
URBAN -0.01 0.00 -7.91
Constant -0.93 0.58 -1.59
OP_AGE 0.14 0.02 8.40
OP_AGESQ -1.63 0.15 -11.09
OP_ED_C 0.06 0.01 4.27
OP_EXP -0.02 0.00 -4.98
OP_EXPSQ 0.00 0.00 4.90
RAISE_OP -0.45 0.10 -4.65
RISK -0.02 0.01 -1.19
SP_HMAK 0.25 0.07 3.42
AMTA_A -0.01 0.00 -3.04
LDP_A 0.00 0.00 -1.91
H_SIZE -0.09 0.03 -2.93
CROPSIZ1 -0.60 0.03 -18.68
NETWORT1 0.00 0.00 -0.88
TENANCY -0.04 0.02 -1.89
CROP456 -0.88 0.09 -9.36
REGN3 0.29 0.13 2.17
REGN567 -0.21 0.08 -2.80
MANUF 0.02 0.01 3.61
TRADE -0.04 0.01 -2.84
RHO 0.12 0.05 2.29
Log-likelihood -1871.73 LR test* 7.13
* The null hypothesis for LR test is: RHO=0, 
   critical value of x
2(0.95,1) is 3.84




  29Table 4: Translog Farm and Houshold Production Functions (1,1) Group
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value
Constant 8.53 11.10 0.77 -17.42 6.18 -2.82
LGHOUR 0.34 2.07 0.16 1.23 2.13 0.58
LGLAND 1.84 0.86 2.15 -0.12 1.01 -0.12
LGLABOR -0.56 0.48 -1.16 0.99 0.46 2.13
LGCA -4.39 1.51 -2.90 2.83 1.70 1.66
HOURSQ -0.12 0.10 -1.17 -0.11 0.16 -0.66
LANDSQ -0.01 0.08 -0.09 -0.09 0.10 -0.84
LABORSQ 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.01 0.01 1.05
CASQ -0.07 0.08 -0.91 0.20 0.13 1.56
HOURLAND -0.29 0.10 -2.84 0.52 0.21 2.46
HOURLABR 0.06 0.05 1.24 -0.16 0.05 -3.33
HOURCA 0.53 0.18 3.03 -0.28 0.23 -1.19
LANDLABR -0.01 0.02 -0.29 0.05 0.04 1.49
LANDCA 0.05 0.15 0.34 -0.40 0.13 -3.09
LABORCA -0.01 0.03 -0.39 -0.04 0.06 -0.63
OUT21SQ 0.04 0.02 2.24 -- -- --
OUT31SQ -0.09 0.04 -2.47 -- -- --
OUT23 0.04 0.04 0.90 -- -- --
OUT2HOUR 0.09 0.04 2.41 -- -- --
OUT2LAND 0.04 0.07 0.60 -- -- --
OUT2LABR 0.02 0.01 1.46 -- -- --
OUT2CA -0.08 0.07 -1.17 -- -- --
OUT3HOUR 0.05 0.06 0.89 -- -- --
OUT3LAND -0.03 0.11 -0.28 -- -- --
OUT3LABR -0.04 0.02 -1.93 -- -- --
OUT3CA -0.02 0.08 -0.22 -- -- --
IMR_CRP 0.08 0.12 0.68 0.51 0.23 2.27









Wald Test* 71.91 12.15
Wald Test
+ 1.54 7.42
* the null hypothesis is: all parameters are equal to zero
 
+the null hypothesis is: IMR_CRP=IMR_OP are jointly equal to zero; x
2(2,0.95)=5.99; x
2(2,0.90)=4.61
** Productiom elasticities, calculated on the sample mean.
Note: Variables defined in Table 2. IMR_CRP and IMR_OP are inverse mills ratios for CRP and OP decisions.




  30Table 5: Translog Farm and Houshold Production Functions (1,0) Group
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value
Constant 11.00 4.24 2.60 -20.00 6.13 -3.26
LGHOUR -0.85 1.45 -0.59 1.85 1.79 1.03
LGLAND -1.01 1.12 -0.91 1.61 1.32 1.22
LGLABOR -0.29 0.21 -1.41 0.49 0.28 1.75
LGCA -1.09 1.17 -0.93 1.77 1.24 1.42
HOURSQ 0.07 0.15 0.44 -0.13 0.19 -0.69
LANDSQ 0.11 0.09 1.31 -0.28 0.10 -2.81
LABORSQ -0.02 0.01 -2.94 0.01 0.01 1.41
CASQ -0.01 0.11 -0.10 -0.08 0.12 -0.67
HOURLAND -0.20 0.18 -1.11 0.29 0.22 1.29
HOURLABR 0.02 0.04 0.48 -0.05 0.06 -0.89
HOURCA 0.20 0.16 1.25 -0.18 0.19 -0.95
LANDLABR 0.08 0.03 2.61 -0.05 0.04 -1.38
LANDCA -0.03 0.16 -0.22 0.11 0.16 0.65
LABORCA -0.05 0.03 -1.66 0.04 0.04 1.06
OUT21SQ 0.04 0.01 3.72 -- -- --
OUT2HOUR 0.12 0.05 2.47 -- -- --
OUT2LAND 0.01 0.07 0.09 -- -- --
OUT2LABR 0.00 0.01 -0.55 -- -- --
OUT2CA -0.03 0.08 -0.46 -- -- --
IMR_CRP 0.04 0.10 0.41 0.25 0.15 1.68









Wald Test* 109.84 68.75
Wald Test
+ 0.29 7.94
* the null hypothesis is: all parameters are equal to zero.
 
+the null hypothesis is: IMR_CRP=IMR_OP are jointly equal to zero; x
2(2,0.95)=5.99; x
2 (2,0.90)=4.61
** Production elasticities, calculated on the sample mean.
Note: Variables defined in Table 2. IMR_CRP and IMR_OP are inverse mills ratios for CRP and OP decisions.
Multiple Output Distance Function Farm Production Function
  31Table 6: Translog Farm and Houshold Production Functions (0,1) Group
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value
Constant 13.86 8.93 1.55 -1.31 0.67 -1.96
LGHOUR -3.70 1.98 -1.87 0.23 0.20 1.16
LGLAND 1.28 0.70 1.83 -0.39 0.24 -1.61
LGLABOR 0.10 0.28 0.36 -0.01 0.08 -0.07
LGCA -0.78 0.69 -1.13 -0.07 0.20 -0.37
HOURSQ 0.24 0.11 2.09 0.00 0.02 -0.26
LANDSQ -0.07 0.02 -4.29 0.11 0.02 5.45
LABORSQ -0.03 0.01 -3.81 0.05 0.00 10.51
CASQ -0.01 0.01 -0.67 0.04 0.02 2.34
HOURLAND -0.14 0.08 -1.69 0.04 0.03 1.29
HOURLABR 0.01 0.03 0.22 -0.03 0.01 -1.78
HOURCA 0.10 0.08 1.16 0.02 0.03 0.80
LANDLABR 0.00 0.01 0.29 -0.03 0.01 -2.93
LANDCA 0.00 0.02 -0.22 -0.06 0.03 -1.97
LABORCA 0.00 0.01 0.47 -0.01 0.01 -0.51
OUT21SQ -- -- -- -- -- --
OUT31SQ -0.07 0.01 -7.07 -- -- --
OUT23 -- -- -- -- -- --
OUT2HOUR -- -- -- -- -- --
OUT2LAND -- -- -- -- -- --
OUT2LABR -- -- -- -- -- --
OUT2CA -- -- -- -- -- --
OUT3HOUR 0.09 0.01 7.74 -- -- --
OUT3LAND -0.11 0.02 -5.93 -- -- --
OUT3LABR 0.00 0.01 -0.47 -- -- --
OUT3CA 0.01 0.02 0.43 -- -- --
IMR_CRP -0.30 0.14 -2.10 -0.05 0.19 -0.24









Wald Test* 119.84 72.35
Wald Test
+ 5.90 0.58
* the null hypothesis is: all parameters are equal to zero.
 
+the null hypothesis is: IMR_CRP=IMR_OP are jointly equal to zero; x
2(2,0.95)=5.99; x
2 (2,0.90)=4.61
** Production elasticities, calculated on the sample mean
Note: Variables defined in Table 2. IMR_CRP and IMR_OP are inverse mills ratios for CRP and OP decisions.
Multiple Output Distance Function Farm Production Function
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Table 7: Production Function (0,0) Group
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value
Constant -4.30 1.97 -2.18
LGHOUR -0.86 0.33 -2.62
LGLAND 0.48 0.33 1.42
LGLABOR 0.62 0.09 6.57
LGCA 0.57 0.51 1.12
HOURSQ 0.14 0.02 5.66
LANDSQ 0.05 0.01 4.80
LABORSQ 0.04 0.00 14.48
CASQ 0.09 0.03 2.83
HOURLAND -0.01 0.05 -0.24
HOURLABR -0.03 0.01 -2.29
HOURCA -0.07 0.07 -1.00
LANDLABR -0.04 0.01 -5.20
LANDCA -0.05 0.03 -2.11
LABORCA -0.07 0.01 -6.15
IMR_CRP 0.15 0.12 1.18












* the null hypothesis is: all parameters are equal to zero
 +the null hypothesis is: IMR_CRP=IMR_OP are jointly equal to zero;
    x
2(2,0.95)=5.99; x
2(2,0.90)=4.6
** Production elasticities, calculated on the sample mean
Note: Variables defined in Table 2. IMR_CRP and IMR_OP are 




  33Table 8: Technical and Scale Efficiencies and Productivities 
Groups Farm Household
T.E (CRP=OP=1) 0.54 0.72
T.E (CRP=1) 0.42 0.32
T.E (OP=1) 0.43 0.67
T.E (None) 0.43 --
T.E Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 1.25 1.69
T.E Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 0.98 0.76
T.E Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 1.01 1.56
T.E Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 0.99 1.11
T.E Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 1.13 1.24
T.E Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 0.87 1.29
P.F Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 0.67 0.61
P.F Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 0.84 0.93
P.F Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 0.86 0.75
T.F.P Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 0.83 1.15
T.F.P Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 0.93 0.87
T.F.P Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 0.75 1.51
*All ratios are calculated based on the non-participant group.
* For the non-participant group, there is no household production.
* Each efficiency index is based on the sample mean of each group.
Ratios of Total Factor Productivities*
Technical Efficiency
Ratios of Technical Efficiencies*
Ratios of Scale Efficiencies*
Ratios of Production Frontiers*
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